Abstract. Based on the rule of law and democracy, this paper illustrates the influence of system on the national auditing quality. Meanwhile, it appraises the auditing quality through utilizing the project database of Open Budge Survey issued by International Budget Partnership. The survey on the empirical research has found that democracy, the rule of law and its mutual adaptability can significantly increase national auditing quality. Difference of systems is the important factor leading to differences of the national auditing quality across countries. Besides, economic state and income level play a positive role in increasing national auditing quality.
Introduction
The national auditing is part of national power supervision and a measure of national governance. Baber W. R. (1983) has found that the fiercer the politics is, the higher the governmental auditing's budge will be. Therefore, it has more motivations to increase national auditing quality. Marks, Barry R. and Raman (1987) believe that political culture advocating individualism will significantly affect national auditing. YANG Shizhan(1986) believes that there is a close bidirectional relationship and internal logic between the national auditing and political democracy. WEN Shuo(1990) believes that the development of democratic politics will change the development direction of national auditing quality. The literatures above fully illustrate the relationship between system and national auditing. From the perspective of political science, national auditing is a tool and product of political civilization, and political system is an important systematic environment of national auditing. Different political systems, the rule of laws and the rule of man will result in differences among national auditing quality. From the perspective of comparison among different countries, this paper studies the systems that affect national auditing through democracy and the rule of law.
Analysis on the Effects of Democracy and the Rule of Law on the National Auditing
Under the democratic system, the national auditing is the systematic arrangement on governmental supervision and restriction and plays a partial role on judiciary supervision and administrative supervision. But under the autocratic system, the national auditing is positioned as assistance to autocratic governance and is empowered by dictators. Under the rule of man, national law is merely a tool of the dictators to rule the country; under the rule of law, power is being supervised through setting up supervisory, inspection and auditing institutions. According to ZHENG's view(2012), democracy and autocracy reveal the intensity of the public's words power in their political life whereas the rule of law and the rule of man reveal the extent of systems being respected in the political life. These two sets of basic political values divide the national political system into four modes: democratic rule of law, autocratic rule of man, autocratic rule of law and democratic rule of man. Under these four modes, different systematic performance is caused by democracy priority or the rule of law priority.
Under different levels of democracy and the rule of law, different supervisory power is given to the national auditing and as a result of that, the national auditing quality varies. Therefore, through affecting the national auditing subordination and jurisdiction, democracy and the rule of law further determines the national auditing quality. Firstly, the national auditing's subordination is different. As to the political system with high-level of democracy and the rule of law, the national auditing is made by the congress representing people's rights and indirectly or directly is subject to principal whereas agents are independent on economy and work, and the national auditing serves people. Under the autocratic rule of man, the national auditing is subject to autocrats and serves the ruler of autocracy or government. Secondly, the national auditing rights involve auditing objects' right, auditing behavior rights and power to dispose and punish.
The auditing objects' rights define the scope of the national auditing. The auditing behavior rights involve inspection right, investigation right, right of deterring and information disclosure right, etc. which defines intensity of the national auditing's enforcement and power to dispose and punish involves intensity of correction by the national auditing and auditees. Under the high-level of democracy and the rule of law, in order to guarantee the auditing's authority, the national auditing rights are regulated under laws and meanwhile cannot be interpreted by government. Therefore, the influence process of democracy and rule of law on the national auditing quality as Figure 1 presents: Figure 1 . Effects of democracy and the rule of law on the national auditing quality.
Variable Selection
In order to measure the difference of democracy and the rule of law, this paper has adopted voice and accountability, rule of law of World Bank's Global Governance Database as two indexes, respectively representing the degree of democracy and the rule of law. As to group political modes, it is based on scores of civil rights, laws and regulations, taking 0 as point of demarcation: As grouping the political mode, 0 is regarded as demarcation point based on the scores of civil rights, laws and regulations; if the scores are larger than 0, it belongs to the political mode MS1, that is, democracy and the rule of law; if the scores are smaller than 0, it belongs to the political mode MS3, that is, the rule of man. Accordingly, the political mode MS2 is autocracy of the rule of law and the political mode MS4 is democracy and the rule of man.
Based on the questionnaire of Open Budget Survey of International Budget Partnership, this paper selects independency, auditing jurisdiction, auditing report's comprehensiveness and auditing communication as the secondary index as agent variables of the national auditing quality. Open Budget Survey has investigated partly supreme auditing institutions' role, independency, and auditing reporting rules, which complies to the relevant index and requirements of the national auditing quality. Moreover, it has investigated 96 countries over the world four times, respectively in 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2012, which complies to requirements of international auditing proposed by this paper. In order to conduct the research scientifically, relevant index in the database have been used by domestic and foreign scholars, such as Cheng Ying et al (2010) .
Variable are specifically described as Table 1 . 
Descriptive Statistics
Under political mode 1, the average values of national auditing quality, democracy and the rule of law are respectively 76.83, 1.04 and 1.08, all of which are higher than those under political mode 3 and political mode 4. It can be initially concluded that national auditing quality, democracy and the rule of law under different political modes are different. 
Empirical Analysis
In model 1 and 2, democracy and the rule of law have a demonstrative role in the national auditing quality, t test is significant within 5% statistically. Model 1 and 2 indicate that democracy has an interacting effect on the national auditing quality and is used for testing the combined functions of democracy and the rule of law. The interacting coefficient is significantly negative, indicating that in the current countries, because, the rule of law cannot fit well the democratization as most countries going through democratization, they are diverted finally. As democracy and the rule of law are conflicting with each other, the national auditing's independency, authority and transparency can hardly be guaranteed, which lowers the national auditing quality. Since the 3rd democratization trend, some emerging countries have been affected by democratic thoughts so that they ignored their history and realities, pushing forward radically democratization without being guaranteed by the rule of law. Democracy and the rule of law could not fit with each other, which worsened corruption. Under model 4 introducing legal system variable FX, indicating that auditing qualities are significantly different under different legal systems. Because common law mostly brings legislative national auditing whereas civil law mostly brings judicial national auditing. The national auditing power of common law is given by congress and greatly independent; though judicial national auditing has the judicial power but it is relatively weak and might conflict with external legal system supervision. After economic development level is controlled, interacting effect model 3 indicates that FX* MS1's coefficient is positive whereas that FX* MS3's coefficient is negative. Under different legal systems, the higher level democracy and the rule of law are, the higher the national auditing quality is, vice versa.
It is more meaningful to analyze income on the national auditing quality under different political mode combinations. Income virtual variable JJ represents countries with low income. Mode 4 indicates that the low income will lower the national auditing quality. In model 5, Under both high-level and low-level democracy and the rule of law, low income will lower the national auditing quality. The national auditing quality of the countries with low income is 0.22 units lower than that of the countries with high income. In the countries with low income, because income is not competitive adequately, the national auditing personnel cannot be motivated to offer high-quality auditing and in order to promote own income, some auditing professionals will seek rent or other opportunities to earn more money instead of putting more effort in improving the national auditing quality. Therefore, it is hard to guarantee high-quality national auditing without ensuring independency of national auditing institutions' expense distribution and national auditing professionals' income.
Conclusion
Given that the data are not obtained through this study, some critical variables and data are not able to be controlled and obtained, which leads to void of key information affecting national auditing quality. But, it is enlightening to learn the systematic factors of the national auditing quality by conducting an empirical research on the cross-study, discussing the factors of the national auditing quality and obtaining results.
Firstly, the legal position of national auditing shall be improved. Therefore, through legislation, national auditing institutions can be responsible with the NPC instead of being subsidiary of State of Council in order to improve its legal position, and give it more power and ensure its independency. Secondly, as some projects' auditing quality is relative low due to lack of feasibility, procedures, scopes and methods can be regulated by legislation to create fair and transparent national auditing process to make the relevant laws available for the auditing professionals so as to improve national auditing quality. Thirdly, auditing accountability system with predominance of national auditing institutions and support of administrative and legal departments should be set up to put the relevant national auditing laws into practice.
